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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 'I'HE 
S'I'1\TE OF UTi.H 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
15512 
ROY J. TIPPETTS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with robbery in ·violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (Supp. 1977). 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty 
of one count of robbery on October 4, 1977, in the Fourth 
Judicial District, in and for Utah County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable J. Robert Bullock presiding. On October 21, 
1977, appellant was sentenced for the indeterminate term, 
not less than one year nor more than fifteen years, in the 
Utah State Prison. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the verdict and 
judgment of the lower court. 
S'l'ATEMENT OF Fl>CTS 
On August 30, 1977, at approximately 12:30 a.m. 
the Riverbend Lounge, located in Provo Canyon, was robbed by 
two men. Four eyewitnesses at the scene described the ev~b I 
as follows: 
Two men entered the bar, asked where the restroom 
was, asked for a beer, asked where the cigarette machine 1vas, 
then exited (T.14,27-28). The two then returned to the bar, 
one holding "something hard" at the back of a customer, 
Joseph E. Faux, who was seated at the bar (T.14,29,36,40) and 
the other went to the bar-:.ender, Lori Elliot, and demanded 
money (T.15,29,35,40). The man who "stuck something hard" 
I 
into Faux's ribs (T.29) was positively identified by the four' 
eyewitnesses at the lounge as appellant Tippetts (T.13,28,36, 
39). They all testified that appellant Tippetts wore a red ' 
shirt, brown vest, levis and a cowboy hat (T.13,28,36,39). 
Utah Highway Patrol Trooper John N. Moon, who arrested the 
defendants, also testified that on the night of August 30, 
appellant Tippets was so dressed (T. 4 7) . A similar positive 
i 
identification was made on co-defendant Lopez and the clo~~I 
-2-
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he worc--footboll sweat shirt with the numbers "78" on it, 
cap ana levis (T.13-14,28,36,38,47). 
Elliot testif ied--and the three other bar partons 
corroborated her testimony--that appellant Tippetts told Faux 
"don't move or I'll put one of these through you into the 
bar" (T.15,29) and that co-defendant Lopez first demanded 
$50, then $100, then all the money in the cash register (T.15, 
29,35,40). A later accounting showed that $314 was taken 
from the lounge. Elliot also testified, and was supported 
by the other three witnesses, that co-defendant Lopez then 
pulled the phone cord out of the wall, threatened anyone who 
tried to follow and the two sped away in a white, rusty old 
Ford (T.16-17,33,36,41). Elliot then called the police on 
a pay phone and she gave a description of the car and suspects 
to the Highway Patrol (T.16-17). Trooper Moon, who was in 
the general vicinity responded to the call and apprehended 
the suspected vehicle (T.44-46). Four persons were in the 
car and Trooper Moon testified that he recovered and marked 
$250 hidden in the front grill of the car and on the floor 
of the back seat (T.49, State's Exhibit 1). The four occupants 
of the car were identified as Roy J. Tippetts, Gilbert Matthew 
Lopez (aka Henry Lopez because he gave officers the name of 
"Henry Lopez", belonging to one of his brothers, when he was 
arrested) and two of defendant Lopez's brothers (T.52-54). 
-3-
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The two defendants were arrested and charged witl 
the robbery. Both were assigned counsel from the Utah Counh 
Public Defenders' Office to represent them at trial--Lopez 
was assigned Shelden R. Carter and Tippetts was assigned 
Michael D. Esplin. The day before trial began, Carter 
became ill and was unable to attend the trial (T.1-2). In 
a pre-trial conference in Judge Bullock's chambers, Lopez, 
Esplin, who fully represented appellant's interests, and the 
I 
judge discussed the possible actions that could be taken: con-I 
I 
tinuance or proceed with the trial using Esplin as joint I 
counsel (T.1-4). When asked about a possible conflict of 
interest, Esplin replied, ". . I don't know of any real con-
flict. .I don't know now of a conflict between Mr. Tippetts 
and Mr. Lopez." (T.2}. Esplin further stated that he was I 
well versed on Carter's strategy for trial and knew Carter 
had not planned on calling any witnesses (T.3). Both Carur 
and Esplin had discussed the case together (T. 3) . In fact, 
Esplin had previously represented both defendants at pre-
liminary hearing (T.3). Lopez indicated his desire to proc~ 
quickly with the trial. Upon the basis of these representa· 
tions of Esplin and with Esplin's and Lopez's full compl~~~ 
Judge Bullock ruled that the trial would proceed as I 
scheduled (T.4}. 
I' 
-4-
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At the close of the trial the only on the record 
objection ~he defense raade was the judge's refusal to 
include a jury instruction on a lesser included offense of 
theft (T.60,64). The jury returned a verdict of guilty for 
both defendants. Appellant Tippetts now appeals that 
conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT H.Z'\S NOT SHm·m A CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
:CXISTI:D BETlvEEN CO·-DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT IN THEIR DUAL 
REPRESENTATION AND HAS NOT SHOWN HE l·/AS DENIED EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
Appellant bases much of the strength of his appeal 
on the very recent Supreme Court case of Holloway v. Arkansas, 
U.S. (1978), 23, er.L. 3001 and the landmark Supreme 
Court decision of Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). 
Yet a careful reading of those two opinions reveals stark 
dissimilarities between them and the present case. In 
Holloway, the defendants' attorney, who was appointed by the 
court to represent all three defendants, made two motions--
one two and a half weeks before the trial and another the 
day of the trial--for separate counsel. Harold Hall, the 
defendants' attorney, had received information from one of 
the co-defendants that he would run the risk of representing 
-5-
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-conflicting interests. The court denied both motions. 
In the Glasser case, a weak case against Glasser 
was presented by the government and the defendant strongly 
objected to being represented by counsel for his co-
defendant. The possible conflict of interest was laid out 
before the court by the defendants' counsel, Stewart, and 
was duly recorded on the record. Stewart requested that 
separate counsel be appointed. The request was denied. 
However in the present case, neither appellant, 
co-defendant nor Esplin felt a conflict of interest problem 
existed (T.2). No one actively sought separate counsel, as 
seen in Hollaway and Glasser. Also in Holloway and GlassN, 
the records reported that the conflicts of interest indeed 
hampered Hall and Stewart in the presentation of the cases. 
No such hindering conflict is reflected in the record in the 
present case. 
Glasser sets forth an important procedure which 
must be followed in determining whether a conflict of interes 
problem will arise during the trial. The Supreme Court rul~ 
that the conflict must be "brought home to the court" by the 
party who believes he is being denied effective counsel. Jb 
U.S. at 71,76. 
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0lasscr has been interpreted differently in various 
jurisdictions 'iit:h regard to this duty of aripellant to bring 
to the court's attention a possible conflict. As noted in 
John Stewart Geer's article, "Representation of Multiple 
Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and the Pro-
fessional Responsibilities of the Defense Attorney," 62 Minn. 
Law Review 119, 138-139, 
"Even if some evidence of the divided 
loyalties of counsel is apparent from the 
record, the obstacles that a convicted de-
fendant must hurdle to obtain reversal are 
greater in some jurisdictions than others. 
Varied interpretations of the Supreme 
Court's ambiguous decision in Glasser 
account for much of this disparity. 
Regardless of the standard employed, however, 
an examination of results actually reached 
reveals that some courts are less disposed 
to reversing convictions in multiple re-
presentation cases than are others. For 
example, some courts confronted with a 
record containing substantial or over-
whelming evidence against an appellant 
have concluded that defense counsel's mul-
tiple representation did not result in a 
demonstratable conflict; others have rejected 
the notion that the substantiality of a 
government's case renders a defendant's 
constitutional claim less compelling. 
These disparties suggest that a defendant's 
fortunes in a sixth amendment appeal may 
hinge, in large part, on a fortuity of a 
sympathetic appeals court." 
The question of the severity of the standard in Utah was 
resolved by this court in the case of State v. Johnson, 25 
Utah 2d 46, 475 P.2d 543 (1970). The court, interpreting 
-7-
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the Glasser standard, determined that when a convicted 
defendant attacks the validity of the trial proceeding, 
"the burden is upon him to show 
that there was some inpropriety and 
that there is at least some likli-
hood that there was unfairness to 
him. . .475 P.2d at 546. (Emphasis 
added) 
In Holloway, petitioners raised the claim that their 
representation by a single appointed attorney, over their 
objection, violated the federal constitutional guarantee of 
effective assistance of counsel. Thus, the defendants there 
met the strict standard of the Utah court (advancing a claiE!ed 
conflict by petitioners) and would therefore, a fortiori, 
meet any less severe standards of other jurisdictions. 
Because defendants' and counsel's objections to the appoin~ 
ment of a single attorney were timely and the motions were 
denied, the precise Uolloway holding is not unexpected: 
"We hold that the failure, in the 
face of the representations made by 
counsel weeks before trial and again 
before the jury was empanelled, deprived 
petitioners of the guarantee of 
'assistance of counsel.'" 23 Cr. L. 
at 3003-3004. 
Respondent submits that the Holloway holding is 
distinguishable from the present case and that it not be 
given a broader interpretation than its narrow facts and 
circumstances allow. In fact, two important limitations 
-8-
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to Holloway are stressed in Holloway itself. The court 
cm~hasises that attorneys, as officers of the court are, first, 
ttin the best position professionally 
and ethically to determine when a conflict 
of interest exists or will probably develop 
in the course of a trial [citation omitted] . 
Second, defense attorneys have the obliga-
tion upon discovering a conflict of interests, 
to advise the court at once of the problem. 
Finally, attorneys are officers of the court, 
and 'when they address the judge solemnly 
upon the matter before the court, their 
declarations are virtually made under oath.' 
[citation omitted] We find these con-
siderations persuasive.tt 23 Cr. at 3004. 
In the present matter, Esplin, after careful and 
deliberate consideration, determined that there would not be 
any conflict of interest (T.1-4)_ and the court accepted his 
judgment. Esplin related that both he and Carter had worked 
together on the case and Esplin knew how Carter had planned 
on presenting Lopez's case (T.3); he therefore concluded he 
would effectively represent both defendants without a con-
flict of interest. 
The .Holloway court also limits its holding to exclude 
bad faith rnanuverings by defense attorneys. In response to 
Arkansas' concern that the court's holding would place too 
much authority in defense attorneys' hands and undermine the 
trial court's power, the Supreme Court responded by asserting 
that Arkansas 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"has an obvious interest in avoid-
ing such abuses. But our holding does 
not undermine that interest. When an 
untimely motion for separate counsel 
is made for dilatory purposes, our 
holding does not impair the trial 
court's ability to deal with counsel 
who resort to such tactics [citations 
omitted). Nor does our holding pre-
clude a trial court from exploring the 
adequacy of the basis of defense 
counsel's representations regarding a 
conflict of interests without improperly 
requiring disclosure of the conf iden-
tial communications of the client. 
[citation omitted) In this case the 
trial court simply failed to take 
adequate steps in response to the 
repeated motions, objections and 
representations made to it, and no 
prospect of dialtory practices was 
present to justify that failure." 23 
Cr. L. at 3004. 
Respondent suggest~ that this second abuse which 
Arkansas was fearful of is being evidenced in the present 
case. That is, a defense attorney's dilatory action and u~ 
timely motions are being employed as the foundation in the 
present appeal. For no conflict of interest objections were 
raised pre-trial or during trial. No such conflict problem 
appears anywhere in the court record. The only bas is of the 
alleged conflict lies in the post-trial affidavits appearing 
in Appellant's Brief (Appendices A and B). However, these 
affidavits appear as purely self-serving devices (See 
Respondent's Brief, Appendix A). 
One other important aspect of the Holloway decision i 
-10-
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i~ that joint representation 
"is not per se violative of con-
stitutional guarantees oi effective 
assistance of counsel. This principle 
recognizes that in some cases multiple 
defendants can appropriately be repre-
sented by one attorney; indeed, in 
some cases, certain advantages might 
accrue from joint representation. In 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's view: 'Joint 
representation is a means of insuring 
against reciprocal recrimination. A 
common defense often gives strength 
against a common attack.'" Glasser v. 
United States, supra, 315 U.S., at 92 
(dissenting). 23 Cr. L. at 3003. 
This principle has been observed by numerous other 
courts, State v. Jeffery, 515 P.2d 364, (Mont. 1973); Common-
wealth v. LaFleur, 1 Mass. App. 827, 296 N.E.2d 517 (1973). 
In State v. George, 100 Ariz. 350, 414 P.2d 730 (1966) the 
court in a remarkably similar fact situation refused a con-
victed defendant's claim that he was denied effective counsel 
when both defendants initially had counsel but, by arrange-
ment, only one attorney represented the defendants at trial. 
Appellant George raised Glasser v. United States, supra, as 
his basis for appeal. The Arizona high court, however, 
rejected the appeal saying: 
"(w]e find the Glasser case clearly 
distinguishable. In that case the 
trial court appointed an attorney al-
ready in the case to also def end Glasser 
prior to the commencement of the trial. 
The possibility of inconsistent interests 
of the co-defendants was shown the trial 
court, and it was shown that 'Glasser 
wished the benefit of the undivided 
assistance of counsel of his own choice.' 
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None of these facts arc present in the 
principal case. Defendant has failed 
to show any conflict of interest between 
himself and the other defendant repres~nte~ 
by his attorney. [citations omitted] The 
defendants were identified as two of the 
persons responsible for the crimes; were 
arrested together and charged with the 
same crimes; and part of the stolen ite~s 
were found in their possession. 
The only conflict was that George 
desired to establish an alibi. .Had 
defendant made his desires known as to 
.his intent to call alibi witnesses 
prior to the trial, the trial court, in 
its discretion, could have accorrunodated 
his request. 
We will not disturb a trial court's 
denial of a motion for a new trial unless 
it appears there has been an abuse of dis-
cretion. [citations omitted) We cannot 
say the trial court abused its discretion 
in refusing to grant a new trial in this 
case. 
Judgment affirmed." 414 P.2d at 734. 
In the present case a very similar situation exists:/ 
defendants have been positively identified by four persons atl 
the Riverbend Lounge as the two who held up the bar (T.13,28, 
36,39); the defendants were arrested together and charged I 
with the crime (T.52-54); part of the stolen money was fou~ 
in their possession (T.49); appellant now wishes to establi~i 
an alibi and claims alibi witnesses were improperly exclud~ ! 
(Appellant's brief p. 18,21 and Appendices A and B); and 
the trial court has ruled with its discretion as to a 
-12-
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potential conflict of interest (T.1-4). Thus the two cases 
arc most similar. 
Other cases point out that joint representation 
"is not per se violative of constitutional guarantees," 
Holloway, supra. In Barron v. State, 7 Ariz. App. 223, 437 
P.2d 975 (1968), the court ruled that the 
"appellants did not indicate in 
their petition the existence of any 
conflict or potential conflict which 
would impose a duty upon defense 
counsel to suggest that independent 
legal representation be afforded to 
appellants. The appellants cannot 
complain of denial of assistance of 
counsel where no showing of conflict 
has been made [citation omitted] . 
The mere fact that the same attorney 
represented all the defendants does 
not ipso facto warrant habeas corpus 
relief." 437 P.2d at 977. 
Effective assistance is not determined by equal 
numerical ratios of counsel to defendants. State v. Little, 
201 Kan. 101, 439 P.2d 383, (1968), is illustrative of this 
point. 
"Defendant claims the trial court 
erred in appointing the same attorney 
to represent both him and his brother 
because their defenses were interre-
lated and the defendant was thereby 
denied effective assistance of counsel. 
This contention is without merit. 
The record does not support these 
statements. Counsel for appellant 
fails to point out in what particular 
trial counsel failed to fully and 
fairly represent the defendant and 
we fail to discern such a failure." 
439 P.2d at 387. 
-13-
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In order for a claim of joint representation 
resulting in ineffective counsel to be valid, defendants 
must prove their assertions. Thus, in United States v. 
Woods, 544 F.2d 242, (CA6, 1976), the constitutional re-
presentation was outlined as follows: 
"The Sixth Amendment guarantees the 
right to counsel in criminal proceedings 
and a conflict of interest on the part 
of counsel representing two defendants 
may deprive the accused of the effective 
assistance of counsel. Glasser v. United 
States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. ~57, 86 L. 
Ed. 680 (1942). However, the mere fact of 
joint representation does not per se 
establish a denial of the effective assistance of 
counsel [citation omitted]. Our court requires a party 
claiming that joint representation resulted in 
a conflict of interest to demonstrate that 
some actual prejudice resulted to him." 
544 F.2d at 268, 269. 
The Woods court then concluded by asserting that 
"[w]e find no actual conflict of 
interest preventing adequate representa-
tion of appellant Blair. Moreover, it 
would be especially inappropriate for 
us to infer prejudice from the mere fact 
of joint representation where, as was 
the case here, the defendant was advised 
of the possibility of a conflict of 
interest, and of his right to sever his 
case and be represented by separate 
appointed counsel." 544 F.2d at 269. 
Clearly defendant Lopez was informed of his right 
to continue the trial (T.1-4) and it can be inferred that 
Esplin, appellant's original sole counsel, fully explain~ 
-14-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the situation to appellant before the pre-trial conference. 
This can be inferred by Esplin's statements to the court 
(T.2,3) with respect to his assurance that there would be 
no conflict of interest problem when Lopez decided to go 
ahead with the trial on October 4th using Esplin as his 
counsel, Judge Bullock asked Esplin: 
"THE COURT: Do you feel that you 
can do that, Mr. Esplin? 
Mn. ESPLIN: I think so, your Honor. 
I don't know that there's any real con-
flict. IVhen I brought that up, that's 
[sic) the possibility of conflict, I 
don't know now of a conflict between Mr. 
Tippetts and Mr. Lopez. The only thing 
I would point out to the Court, there 
may be a difference in the way the --
THE COURT: 
is concerned? 
As far as testifying 
MR. ESPLIN: As far as testifying 
i·s concerned. At this point I .don't. 
THE COURT: Do you feel that you 
could properly advise both of them in 
that regard? 
MR. ESPLIN: I believe so, your 
Honor. I did represent Mr. Lopez at 
the Preliminary Hearing and also Mr. 
Tippetts. 
THE COURT: So you are conversant 
with the facts in the case and what 
they claim to be, the facts and so on? 
MR. ESPLIN: That's correct, your 
Honor. 
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THE COURT: And as far as you know 
there aren't any other witnesses that 
Mr. Lopez should have present or any-
thing of that nature? 
MR. ESPLIN: No, your Honor, I 
don't know of any. 
THE COURT: Now, Mr. Carter was 
working on the case right up until 
yesterday so that he would have sub-
poenaed any witnesses --
MR. ESPLIN: That's right. 
THE COURT: --that he felt at 
least would aid in Mr. Lopez' defense? 
MR. ESPLIN: Yes. And we dis-
cussed the possibility of a couple other 
witnesses, calling a couple of witnesses, 
and discounted the doing that, both Mr. 
Carter and myself." (T.2-3) 
Thus, it is clear that Esplin in no way felt a con-
flict of interest would arise; that he believed he could 
represent both defendants adequately; and that he and Carter 
had discussed trial strategy prior to Carter becoming ill so 
Esplin was well aware of both defendants' possible defenses. 
No mention was made of the alleged conflict which appella~ 
now claims Esplin had been informed of in September, 1977. 
Respondent submits that no such conflict as alleged existed 
prior to or during the trial and defendants were effective~ 
repr€sented (See Respondent's Appendix A). 
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POI!TT II 
T~rn TRI7l,L COUc?.T ~1.E'J' I'l'S DUTY OF ASCER'rAINING 
\'iHETIIER DE~'Et:JDJ\llTS \70ULD BE DEPIUVED OF THEIR SIXTH 
AMEl'iDMEllT RIGHTS BY JOIN'l' REPRESEN'fATION. 
In both Glasser v. United States, supra, and 
Holloway v. Arkansas_, supra, the United States Supreme Court 
stresses the fact that the trial judge has the responsibility 
to assure that the accused receives all the protections of 
law. In Glasser the court said: 
"Upon the trial judge rests the 
duty of seeing that the trial is con-
ducted with solicitude for the 
essential rights of the accused. 
The trial court should protect the 
right of an accused to have the assis-
tance of counsel." 315 U.S. at 71 
Later in the opinion, the court again emphasizes this important 
trial court function and cautions trial judges against 
random dismissal of a counsel's conflict of interest claim. 
"Of equal importance with the duty 
of the court to see that an accused 
has the assistance of counsel is its 
duty to refrain from embarrassing 
counsel in the defense of an accused 
by insisting, or indeed, even suggest-
ing, that counsel undertake to con-
currently represent interests which 
might diverge from those of his first 
client, when the possibility of that 
divergence is brought home to the 
court." 315 U.S. at 76. 
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These same instructions to trial court judges are echoed 
in the Hollm-wy opinioE. 23 Cr. r.. at 300t. 
In the instant case, Judge Bullock should be com-
r~ended for his thorough examination into potential problems 
with Esplin acting as joint counsel for the defendan:~s ('l'.1-4), 
None of the cautions or Harnings that the Glasser and llollowa\ 
opinions detail as possible trial court abuses are evidenced 
in the present case. 
The federal court system has ado?ted this same 
responsibility for its trial courts. In United States v. 
Foster, 469 F.2d 1 (CAl, 1972), the court not only forceful~ 
sets the requirements for trial judge examinations, but also 
details how such an examination will limit a defendant's 
ability to attack joint representation on appeal. 
"Under those circumstances, where 
trial commences after the publication 
date of this opinion, it shall be the 
duty of the trial court, as early in 
the litigation as practicable, to com-
ment on some of the risks confronted 
where defendants are jointly represent-
ed to insure that defendants are aware 
of such risks, and to inquire diligently 
whether they have discussed the risks 
with their attorney, and whether they 
understand that they may retain separate 
counsel, or if qualified, may have such 
counsel appointed by the court and paid 
for by the government.. .There may be 
unusual circumstances where,. .the 
court may exercise its discretion to 
pursue the inquiry with defendants and 
their counsel on the record but in 
chambers. 
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If the court has carried out 
this duty of inquiry, then to the 
extent a dcfcn~ant later attemots 
to attack his conviction on gr~unds 
of conflict of interest arising from 
joint representation he will bear 
a heavy burden indeed of persuading 
us that he ~as, for that reason, de-
p_rived of a fair tria_l. 
~·Jhen a satisfactory in0ury does 
not appear on the record, the burden 
Of-persuasion will shift to the --
government. If the case comes before 
us on direct appeal, the government 
will be required to demonstrate from 
the record that prejudice to the de-
fendant was ir.1probable." 469 F.2d at 
4,5 (Emphasis added) 
Appellant relies on Foster to stand for the pro-
position that "a lack of satisfactory judicial inquiry" into 
joint representation problems automatically shifts the 
burden of persuasion to the government. (Appellant's Brief, 
p.14). However, a careful reading of the case reveals that 
the burden shifts only if "a satisfactory inquiry does 
not appear on the record." Foste£, supra. at 5. Appellant 
urges that the burden is now on respondent to prove no con-
Elict of interest existed. Respondent contends, however, 
that inasmuch as the trial judge's careful examination into 
the possible conflict is well documented on the record (T.1-4) 
no such burden shifts to respondent. On the contrary, the 
Foster decision holds that when such an inquiry is on the 
record, appellant--it is worth repeating--"will bear a heavy 
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burden indeed of persuading us that he was, for that reason, 
deprived of a fair t.rial." 4.69 F.2d at 5. 
In a remarkably similar case to the present-. matter, 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that when 
appellant's counsel beca~e ill during trial, the trial court 
could properly make a determination whether to continue the 
trial by having counsel for co-defendant act as appellant's 
attorney or appoint separate counsel. !Jnited States v. Dard1, 
330 F.2d 316 (CA2, 1964), cert denied 379 U.S. 845 (1964). 
The trial court ruled that such an 
"[a]ssignrrent '-''Ould not give rise 
to a conflict of interests, but 
indicated that if a conflict were to 
arise, the appropriate precautions 
would be taken." 330 F.2cl at 335. 
The Circuit Court then continued by ruling that while 
"the right to counsel is absolute, 
its exercise must be 'subject to the 
necessities of sound judicial adminis--
tration.' [citation omitted]; and 
where there appears to be no conflict, 
the court may, in its discretion, 
assign to a defendant the attorney of 
a co-defendant.. .Such an assign-
ment is not, in itself, a denial of 
effective assistance of counsel. 
Since Glasser v. United States [supra] 
it has been clear that some confllct -
of interest must be shown before an 
appellant can successfully claim that 
representation by an attorney also 
engaged by another defendant deprived 
him of his right to counsel." 330 F.2d 
at 335. 
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These same circuDstances are present in the 
inst.0nt case: co-defendant's counsel became ill during 
the course of the litigation, the trial court made a deter-
mination that appellant's counsel could effectively represent 
both defendants, and no clear showing was made at the in-
chambers conference as to a conflict of interest. 
It is respondent's position that Judge Bullock 
made a proper and adequate investigation into possible con-
flict problems and he discharged well his duty of inquiry 
into whether a joint counsel assignment \·10uld deprive 
appellant of his Sixth Amendment rights. 
POINT III 
BY Rl\ISING 'I'HE l\LLEGED COIJFLICT OF INTEREST CL/UM 
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON i\PPEAL, APPELLANT HAS WAIVED THAT BASIS 
OF APPEAL BECAUSE :!:T WAS NOT Tll-11".LY RAISED. 
The Holloway decision twice refers to the importance 
of raising objections to joint representation in a timely 
fashion. The thrust of that decision, which the dissenting 
judges had great reservations about, can be seen in the court's 
interpretation of Glasser. 
"We read the Court's opinion in Glasser, 
however, as holding that whenever a trial -
court improperly requires joint representa-
tion over timely objection reversal is 
automatic." 23 Cr. L. at 3005. 
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To soften the blow of the harsh result of "automatic 
reversal," the court assuag~a the dis3~ntPYS b~ e~ph~si~ing 
that such a result would occur only under very narrow cir-
cumstances. With regard to the "automatic reversal" rule, 
the court said by 
"requiring a defendant to show that 
a conflict of interests--which he and 
his counsel tried to avoid by timely 
objections to the joint representation--
prejudiced him in some specific fashion 
would not be susceptible to intelligent, 
even-handed application." 23 Cr. L. at 
3005 
These two excerpts point out that in order for 
appeal courts to look favorably upon a claimed conflict of 
interest and ineffective counsel reotions, such objections 
must be "timely." Otherwise, the objections on appeal will 
"be susceptible to intelligent, even-handed application." 
The Supreme Court of Illinois has ruled that where 
a defendant at trial made no objection to being represented 
jointly with his co-defendant, and where there was no sug-
gestion by either defendant that a conflict of defenses 
existed, the objection raised on appeal alleging such was 
"completely unsupported by this 
record which contain[ed] no evidence 
of the theory. .relied upon. McCasle's 
defense was his uncorroborated testirnonal 
alibi. .Additionally, there is no show-
ing that defendant was prejudiced by 
counsel's representation of both him and 
his co-defendant. .we ought not to 
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dj sturb a jud~ent _on the basis of 
conjectural or speculative conflicts 
b~br?en thP interests of co-defendants 
whichare envisioned for the firo;t 
tim~appea;h. People v. McCasle, 
35 Ill.2d 552, 221 N.E.2d 227, 230 
(1966) (Emphasis added) 
Much the same situation is presently before the 
court. Appellant comes before the appellate court only now 
waiving the banner of conflict of interest at this late 
date. No mention was made of such an objection at trial. 
No alibi testimony or denied defense witnesses objection can 
be found in the record. Compare this stark absence with 
the record in the Holloway case where, when a testifying co-
defendant made a statement so startling and incriminating 
to appellant from the witness stand, appellant, Holloway, 
jumps to his feet to make a pro se objection. Other recorded 
examples of the conflict are evident as well. No such attempt 
by appellant is present in the instant case. On point here is 
the case of Coates v. Lawrence, 46 F.Supp. 414 {1942), where 
the District Court held 
"[i]t is a familiar rule of 
evidence that silence, when there is 
a duty to speak, is tantamount to, 
and often creates an estoppel against, 
or waiver of the right of, later say-
ing otherwise." 46 F.Supp. 424 
Such a rule of silence being interpreted as a 
waiver, however, is a severe result and must only be triggered 
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under circumstances where the defendant was cognizan~ of 
giving up a right. As is stated in People v. Johnson, 74 
Cal. Rptr. 889, 450 P.2d 265 (1969) 
"[t]he determination of whether 
there has been an intelligent waiver 
of the right to counsel must depend, 
in each case, upon the particular 
facts and circumstances surrounding 
that case, including the background, 
experience, and conduct of the accused." 
450 P.2d at 269. 
The California court has further defined this 
principle in People v. Mattson, 51 Cal.2d 777, 336 P.2d 937, 
(1959) by outlining the particular circumstances required 
for a defendant to have properly waived the claim of denial 
of effective counsel on appeal. The waiver is determined by 
"such matters as the intricacy of 
the accusatory pleading, the complexity 
of the law as to the offense charged 
and included offenses, defendant's 
intelligence, education, experience 
(including familiarity with the criminal 
law derived from prior prosecutions), 
youth, mental and physical health and 
emotional condition, the attitude of 
the court and the prosecuting officials 
and the existence of inflamed public 
opinion, and also the severity of the 
penalty. Considering the foregoing 
matters, the courts have developed 
familiar rules,. .as to the scope of 
an accused's right to representation 
by counsel at the trial and in the 
antecedent proceedings." 336 P.2d at 
946. 
One reason courts are reluctant to accept dilato0 
objections raised only on appeal is the court's desire to 
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avoid "piecernea_l litigation." 
In the California case of Wieczorek v. Texas Co., 
45 Cal.App.2d 450, 114 P.2d 377 (1941), the court rejected 
an objection raised first on appeal and ruled 
"[i]t is the policy of the law 
that litigation shall not be had 
in piecemeal and that when a party 
has a defense to a pending cause 
of action it must be presented 
then, otherwise it will be deemed 
waived." 114 P.2d at 382. 
The same court ruled one year later that if 
"the natter was within the 
scope of the action, related to 
the subject-matter and relevant 
to the issue0, sc that it could 
have been raised, the judgment 
is conclusive on it despite the 
fact that it v1as not in fact 
expressly plead or otherwise 
urged. .Dilatory tactics in 
neglecting to present all points 
on a first appeal may often lead 
to an ineffective disposition of 
the rights of the respective 
parties on the vital question of 
time limitation. . In the present 
case it might cause confusion. 
The courts do not countenance 
piecemeal litigation." Ormitz v. 
Board of Dental Examiners, 55 
cai.App.2a sss, u2 P.2a 212, 
275-276 (1942). 
Similar confused, piecemeal, dilatory tactics are 
present in the instant case. Respondent urges the court 
to rule that appellant has waived his claimed alibi defense 
by not raising it at trial. The attempted defense and 
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alleged conflict of interest should be quickly diposed 
of by the court as manipulative manuverings. 
POINT IV 
WHEN DOUBT ARISES AS TO llHETHER EITHER A) 
APPELLANT RECIEVED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL OP B) 
A CONFLICT OF INTEREST EXISTED AT TRIAL, 'l'HE QUESTIOfJS 
MUST BE RESOLVED BY EXI\.MINING THE COUl~T RECORD. 
Several Utah Supreme Court cases hold that when ~ 
appellant is claiming he has been denied effective represen-
tation, the court must look to the record to determine if 
appellant's contention has merit. State v. Farnsworth, 13 
Utah 2d 103, 368 P.2d 914 (1962); State v. Dodge, 19 Utah 
I 
13, 492 P.2d 978 (1972). Perhaps Justice Crockett best I 
2d 44, 425 P.2d 781 (1967); and State v. Heath, 27 Utah 2d 
appellants in I 
2d 354, 517 P.2d 
summed up this frequent objection raised by 
the recent case of State v. Harris, 30 Utah 
1313 (1974), when he said: 
"In regard to the defendant's con-
tention that he was denied effective 
counsel: we are impelled to remark 
that it is nothiny less than shameful 
that our law seems to have degenerated 
to a point where whenever an accused 
is convicted of crime, the charge of 
incompetency of counsel is, with ever 
increasing frequency, leveled at 
capable attorneys who have given 
entirely adequate service, when the 
-26--
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real difficulty was that he had 
a guilty client. In this respect 
also defendant had his entitle-
ment of adequate representation 
by capable and conscientious 
counsel." 517 P.2d at 1315 
Notlling in the present record indicates that 
appellant was denied effective counsel. On the contrary, 
the record shows that counsel very methodically and deliberately 
worked in appellant's best interests (T.1-4, especially). 
This same analysis of the record is needed to 
ansv1er appellant's charge that a conflict of interest existed 
between him and co-defendant Lopez. United States v. Gallagh~r, 
437 F.2d 1191, (CA7, 1971), stands for the proposition that 
"The existence of a conflict of 
interest, to warrant the result here 
sought, must be founded on something 
more than mere speculation or surmise. 
We perceive nothing in this record 
which demonstrates the existence of 
any real conflict of interest between 
the defendants. And counsel had 
ample opportunity to make such a 
showing if such conflict existed." 
437 F.2d at 1194 
The court denied defendant's motion for a new trial 
and affirmed his conviction. State courts follow the same 
standard of examination of record. In ~~ate v. Kennedy, 8 
Wash. App. 633, 508 P.2d 1386 (1973), a defendant appealed 
his conviction on grounds of both ineffective counsel and 
conflict of interest. The court rejected defendant's claim 
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that he need only establish " a possibility of conflict 
or pre-judice" and went on to rule that 
"when we revie\v the proceedings 
in this trial court we are not con-
fined to the application of such a 
speculative standard. Concededly, in 
judging the effectiveness of counsel 
we must indulge in some sort of 
speculation as we see only the 'tip 
of the iceberg' in the record before 
us. [citation omitted). However, we 
do have the verbatim transcript of 
the proceedings in the trial court. 
Accordingly, if we can find anything 
in the record which indicates that 
there is a possibility that the de-
fendant may have been actually pre-
judiced, he has been denied his right 
to effective counsel. [citation omitted) 
We do not find even a possibility 
that the defendant may have been 
actually prejudiced." 508 P.2d at 
1389. 
In searching the record of the present case, the 
only reference to a conflict of interest problem appears 
at the pretrial discussion in Judge Bullock's chambers (T. 
1-4). After carefully considering the matter Lopez, Esplin, 
.. 
the trial judge, and appellant--through the proxy representa· 
tion of Esplin acting in his behalf--all agreed that there 
would be no conflict problem. 
decision was made that, ". 
between Mr. Tippetts and Mr. 
In Esplin's own words, the 
I 
. I don't know now of a conflict I 
Lopez. " (T. 2) . 
In appellant's reliance on Glasser v. United Sta~,[ 
I 
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~-' one important ruling of the Supre:".e Court's decision 
is ~bsent from appel1ant's brieE. In determining a court's 
role in reviewing a conviction, the high court rules 
"[i)t is not for us to weigh 
the evidence or to determine the 
credibility of witnesses. The 
verdict of a jury must be sustained 
if there is substantial evidence, 
taking the view most favorable to 
the Government, to support it." 
315 U.S. at 30. 
A reviewing court, therefore, may only look at the 
court record and evidence presented at trial and must affirm 
the conviction if ''substantial evidence" supports it. Appellant 
would have this court rely upon two self-serving affidavits 
attached as appendices to his brief as the sole basis for 
establishing a conflict of interest between the two de-
fendants. Utah case law is very clear with regard to the 
unacceptablility of "facts" stated in briefs as bases for 
appeal. The Utah Court in Watkins v. Simonds, 14 Utah 2d 406, 
385 P.2d 154 (1963), stated: "this court cannot consider 
facts stated in the briefs which may be true but absent in 
the official record." 385 P.2d at 155. See also Cooper v. 
~oresters Underwriters, Inc., 123 Utah 215, 257 P.2d 540 
(1953); Skyline v. Data-cap, 545 P.2d 512 (Utah, 1976). 
The reliance by appellant on such improper "facts" 
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discolors his entire brief--for when appellant has no sound 
basis on which to build his conflict of interest review, 
the whole appeal must fail. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent contends that appellant was not denied 
effective assistance of counsel and that no conflict of 
interest existed between co-defendant Lopez and appellant 
Tippetts (See Respondent's Appendix A). It must again be 
stressed that joint representation is not per se violative 
of Sixth Amendment rights. 
The trial court properly dealt with and fulfilled 
its duty of ascertaining whether defendants would be deprived 
of their constitutional rights. 
Respondent submits that appellant has waived his 
right to object to his dual representation because the motioo 
has not been timely raised. 
A search of the official trial record is the sole 
basis for resolving claims of either conflict of interest m 
ineffective trial counsel. It is respondent's position that 
such a search will result in finding no basis for appellant's 
claims. 
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Respondent asserts that the rulings of the lower 
court were proper and prays that the conviction be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. F..1\.l'JSON 
Attorney General 
MICHAEL L. DEAMER 
Dep~ty Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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l\PPLi:JJJD'. !1 
SUPl~Ef-1E C 0 U R T 0 F U T /\ H 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE Crrv~ UTAH 
TilE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs- A F F I D A V I T. 
ROY J. TIPPETTS, llo. 15512 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ST JI.TE OF UTAH, 
SS. 
COUNTY OF UTAH. 
MICHAEL D. ESPLIN, being first duly sworn 
according to law, deposes and says: 
1. That I am the defense counsel who repre-
sented Roy J. Tippetts and Gilbert M. Lopez (aka Henry Lopez 
during the course of the trial) in the above entitled action 
in the District Court in and for the Fourth Judicial District, 
Utah County, Utah, on the 4th day of October, 1977. 
2. That there was not a conversation as 
alleged by Appellant's friend in her Affidavit attached to 
Appellant's brief (Appendix B). No such discussions of a 
possible alibi for Appellant was ever held in my office during 
September, 1977. No such conversations with Joy Anderson, 
and Sandra Gibson was held in my office prior to trial. A 
conversation did take place with Appellant's sister after the 
trial had been held wherein she alleged a purported alibi for 
Appellant. 
Dated this Joth day of June, 1978. 
MICHAEL D,. ESPi'IN ' 
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Page 2 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to hefore me this 
J(;"j}_ day of June, 1978. 
·, .. 
NOTl\RY PUBLIC 
Residing at: {( ~?j {,(-
My Commission Expires: 
j 
I j 
I 
I ) 
I 
I 
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